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An Examination of Pennsylvania's
Treatment of Telecommunications Towers
for the Purpose of Real Property Taxation
Bradley N. Sprout*
I. Introduction
The cellular telecommunications industry has been experiencing
rapid growth since the beginning of the 1990's.1 In 1990, the industry
employed approximately 21,000 workers, had over 5 million cellular
subscribers, and received $4.5 billion in revenue from its cellular
2services. By 2002, the industry employed over 190,000 workers, had
over 140 million cellular subscribers, and received over $76 billion in
revenue from its cellular services.3
Integral to the daily operations of the cellular telecommunications
industry are the over 139,000 cell sites4 that are located across the United
States.5 Each of these cell sites contains a telecommunications tower,
antennas, and other radio equipment used in transmitting signals to, and
receiving signals from, cellular devices.6 These towers, along with the
tower facilities, are not owned by cellular telecommunications
companies, but rather by companies in the telecommunications tower
industry]
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A., magna cum laude, Dickinson College, 2003.





5. See Marshall Brain & Jeff Tyson, How Cell Phones Work, HowSTUFFWORKS,
http://www.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). Cell sites are
also known as "base stations" and "tower facilities." See id.; Shenandoah Mobile Co. v.
Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 534 (Ct. Com.
P1. Cumberland County 2004).
6. Brain & Tyson, supra note 5.
7. See Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 534-
37.
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In Pennsylvania, an important question that has been raised about
telecommunications towers is whether these towers are subject to real
8property taxation. Between October 2003 and September 2004,
Pennsylvania common pleas courts in Cumberland, Dauphin, and
Venango counties attempted to answer this question, holding, albeit for
different reasons in each case, that telecommunications towers are
subject to real property taxation.9  In February of 2005, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the common pleas
courts in their final result, holding that telecommunications towers are
subject to real property taxation.'0 These court decisions could result in a
significant legal and financial burden for the tower industry, possibly
resulting in tower companies having to pay millions of dollars a year in
real property taxes."
This comment examines Pennsylvania's treatment of
telecommunications towers with respect to real property taxation. Part
II reviews Pennsylvania's law concerning real property taxation and
summarizes common pleas courts' rulings on whether
telecommunications towers are subject to real property taxation.12 Part II
also gives a brief description of telecommunications towers and tower
facilities. Part III analyzes whether, under Pennsylvania law,
telecommunications towers should be subject to real property taxation.
Part III also examines, for comparative purposes, New York's treatment
of telecommunications towers. Finally, Part IV offers a suggestion as to
how Pennsylvania could reform its law to further clarify whether
telecommunications towers are subject to real property taxation.
8. See Matt Miller, Cell Phone Towers Can Be Taxed, Judge Rules, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Sept. 17, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 57770791.
9. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 548;
Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. &
C.4th 140, 148 (Ct. Com. PI. Dauphin County 2004), aff'd 869 A.2d 562 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005); SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-
620, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Com. Pl. Venango County Oct. 8, 2003).
10. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869
A.2d 562, 569 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). While this case affirmed the holding of the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, the Commonwealth Court's analysis in
reaching its holding was more akin to the analysis used by the Cumberland County Court
of Common Pleas in holding that telecommunications towers are subject to real property
taxation. Compare Dauphin County Bd. ofAssessment Appeals, 869 A.2d at 566-69, with
infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
11. Miller, supra note 8, at BI.
12. Although the Commonwealth Court has ruled on whether telecommunications
towers are subject to real estate taxation, Part II will limit its review to the common pleas
courts' decisions in order to present the full array of ways in which the courts have dealt
with the issue of taxation of telecommunications towers. Discussion of the
Commonwealth Court's decision will be reserved for analyzing the proper treatment of
telecommunications towers with respect to real property taxation in Part III.
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II. Background
A. The Law Concerning the Assessment of Real Property Taxes in
Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, real property is subject to taxation under title 72,
section 5020-201 of the Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated. 13  Section
5020-201 enumerates a number of items-such as houses, buildings, and
lots of land-that are traditionally defined as real property and subject to
real property taxation.' 4 However, chattels, which are commonly defined
as "tangible, movable personal property[,]'' 15 are not enumerated as items
subject to real property taxation.16 Nevertheless, section 5020-201
includes a catch-all provision stating that "all other real estate not exempt
by law from taxation" is also subject to real property taxation.
17
Therefore, under the catch-all provision of section 5020-201, chattels
used in association with real property may be classified as fixtures 18 of
13. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201 (West Supp. 2004). Section 5020-201 provides in
pertinent part:
The following subjects and property shall, as hereinafter provided, be valued
and assessed, and subject to taxation for all county, city, borough, town,
township, school and poor purposes at the annual rate:
(a) All real estate, to wit: Houses, house trailers and mobilehomes
buildings permanently attached to land or connected with water, gas,
electric or sewage facilities, buildings, lands, lots of ground and ground
rents, trailer parks and parking lots, mills and manufactories of all kinds,
furnaces, forges, bloomeries, distilleries, sugar houses, malt houses,
breweries, tan yards, fisheries, and ferries, wharves, all office type
construction of whatever kind, that portion of a steel, lead, aluminum or
like melting and continuous casting structures which enclose, provide
shelter or protection from the elements for the various machinery, tools,
appliances, equipment, materials or products involved in the mill, mine,
manufactory or industrial process, and all other real estate not exempt by
law from taxation.
Id. (emphasis added). In reality, the assessment of real property in fourth to eighth class
counties is governed by title 72, section 5453-201 of the Pennsylvania Statutes
Annotated. See id. § 5453-201. However, because section 5020-201 and section 5453-
201 are almost identical in their language, application, and effect, this comment will refer
only to section 5020-201 (the General County Assessment Law). Compare id. § 5020-
201, with id. § 5453-201.
14. Id. § 5020-201. Items traditionally defined as real property include "[1]and and
anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be
severed without injury to the land." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (7th ed. 1999).
15. 6 RACHEL M. KANE, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE § 3:6 (2d ed.
2000).
16. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201; see also 27 JOSEPH C. BRIGHT, SUMMARY OF
PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE § 15:7 (2d ed. 1998).
17. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201.
18. A fixture is defined as "an article in the nature of personal property which has
been so annexed to the realty that it is regarded as part and parcel of the land." Gore v.
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real property, thus subjecting them to real property taxation. 19
Pennsylvania courts have developed a test to determine whether
chattels used in association with real property have become fixtures of
real property.20 This test examines the physical connection between the
chattel and the real property with which it is associated to determine
whether the chattel is so affixed to the real property that the chattel can
actually be considered part of the real property.2'
In Clayton v. Lienhard, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
announced a test that divides chattels into three categories based upon
their physical connection to the real property with which they are
associated.22  The first category of chattels includes ones "which are
manifestly furniture,.... and not peculiarly fitted to the property with
which they are used[.]y 23  Chattels in this category are considered
personalty and are not subject to real property taxes.24 The second
category of chattels includes ones that are affixed to the real property in a
manner that does not allow them to be removed "without material injury
to the real estate or to themselves[.],, 25  Chattels in this category are
considered realty, and thus fixtures, regardless of whether their owners
intended them to become part of the real property.26 The third category
of chattels includes chattels which are affixed to the real property in a
manner that allows them to be removed "without destroying or materially
injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are
annexed[.],,27  Whether chattels in this category are considered
personalty or realty is dependent upon whether their owners intended
them to become fixtures when the chattels were attached to the real
property.28
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has added a gloss to the
third Clayton category of chattels, setting forth three factors (the
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a fixture as "[p]ersonal property
that is attached to land or a building and that is regarded as an irremovable part of the real
property, such as a fireplace built into a home.").
19. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201; In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding that removable canopies over gasoline pumps are fixtures of
the gasoline station, and thus are subject to real property taxation); see also 27 BRIGHT,
supra note 16, § 15:7.
20. See Clayton v. Lienhard, 167 A. 321, 322 (Pa. 1933); In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d
at 1013-14; Gore, 537 A.2d at 915.
21. See cases cited supra note 20.






28. Clayton v. Lienhard, 167 A. 321, 322 (Pa. 1933).
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Gore/Sheetz factors) to aid in determining whether a chattel has become
a fixture of real property.29 The first factor taken into consideration is
the manner in which the chattel is attached to the real property.30 This
factor involves an inquiry into both the damage which would result from,
as well as the effort which must be put forth in, the removal of a chattel
from the real property.31 However, a lack of resulting damage, or a lack
of difficulty in removing the chattel, does not preclude the chattel from
being deemed a fixture. 32 The second factor taken into consideration is
whether the chattel is essential to the use of the real property to which it
is attached.33 Finally, the third factor taken into consideration is whether
the party attaching the chattel to the real property intended the chattel to
become a permanent fixture of the real property.3n
The third Gore/Sheetz factor is the factor that is afforded the most
weight in determining whether a chattel has become a fixture.35 In fact,
the first two factors are regarded as evidence as to whether a party
36intended the chattel to become a permanent fixture of the real property.
Furthermore, permanence is defined as the chattel being affixed to the
real property until the chattel is "worn out, until the purpose to which the
realty is devoted is accomplished or until the item is superseded by
another item more suitable for the purpose. 37
Nevertheless, even chattels that could be considered permanent
fixtures of real property may be excluded from real property taxation.38
Section 5020-201, under its industrial establishment exception,
enumerates a group of chattels which are exempt from real property
taxation, namely "[m]achinery, tools, appliances and other equipment
contained in any mill, mine, manufactory or industrial establishment[.],,
39
In order for a fixture to be excluded under the industrial
establishment exception, several requirements must be met.4 0 First, the
29. See In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Gore v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). The Gore/Sheetz
factors were first set forth in Gore, see 537 A.2d at 915, and were then elaborated upon in
In re Sheetz, Inc., see 657 A.2d at 1013-14.
30. In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d at 1013; Gore, 537 A.2d at 915.
31. In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d at 1013-14.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1014; Gore, 537 A.2d at 915.
34. In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d at 1014; Gore, 537 A.2d at 915.
35. In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d at 1014.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Michigan Nat'l Bank v. City of Lansing, 293 N.W.2d 626, 627
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980)).
38. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. WIIC-TV Corp., 321 A.2d 387, 387 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1974).
39. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201 (West Supp. 2004).
40. See In re Borough of Aliquippa, 175 A.2d 856, 861-62 (Pa. 1961); City of
Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388.
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fixtures in question must be either contained within, or attached to, a
facility that is considered an industrial establishment.41 If the facility that
the fixtures are contained within or attached to is not considered an
industrial establishment, then the fixtures are not excluded from real
property taxation.42 In deciding whether a facility is an industrial
establishment, courts look to whether or not the ordinary man would
consider the structure an industrial establishment, construing any doubt
in favor of the taxpayer.43
If the facility where the fixtures are located is considered an
industrial establishment, then the court must consider whether or not the
fixtures "are [1] used directly in manufacturing the products that the
establishment is intended to produce and [2] are necessary and integral
parts of the manufacturing process and [3] are used solely for
effectuating that purpose[.] ' 44  If the fixtures meet these three
requirements, they are excluded from real property taxation under section
5020-201's industrial establishment exception.45 However, if the fixtures
fail to satisfy even one of the above requirements, they then are deemed
taxable as real property under section 5020-201.46
B. Telecommunications Towers-An Overview of Their Purpose,
Characteristics, Erection, and Disassembly
There are three main types of telecommunications towers:
monopole towers (cylindrical, self-supporting towers); guyed towers
(three- or four-legged towers which are supported by guy wires); and
self-supporting or lattice towers (three- or four-legged towers which are
supported solely by their legs).47 These towers are part of a larger tower
facility, which normally includes the tower itself, a concrete
pad/foundation, antennas, equipment shelters, coaxial cables, electrical
generators, and fencing.48 Telecommunications towers are integral parts
41. See City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 387-88.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 388 (citing Messenger Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 132 A.2d 768, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957)).
44. In reBorough ofAliquippa, 175 A.2d at 861.
45. See id. at 861-62.
46. See, e.g., In re W. Penn Power Co., 588 A.2d 997, 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(holding that oil storage tanks located at a power plant-an industrial establishment-
were not excluded from real property taxation under section 5020-201 because their
primary purpose was for storage, and not the manufacturing of power at the facility).
47. OFFICE OF REAL PROP. SERV., THE VALUATION OF TOWERS AND ASSOCIATED
REAL PROPERTY 4-6 (2001), available at http://www.orps.state.ny.us/sas/valuation/
index.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
48. See id. at 6-9; see also Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 534 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cumberland County
2004); SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-620,
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of tower facilities because they host the antennas that are used to transmit
signals to and receive signals from cellular devices. 49 The land that these
tower facilities occupy is generally leased by the tower companies for
extended periods of time, with many leases having the potential to last
over twenty years. 50
The erection of a telecommunications tower begins with the
clearing of the tower site and the creation of an access road. 5' After the
site has been cleared, part of the land is excavated for the concrete
foundation, and rebar cages, which contain the bolts to which the tower
will be attached, are placed in the ground.52 The concrete foundation is
then poured, leaving only the bolts protruding from the foundation.53
Because telecommunications towers are brought to tower sites in
various pieces, the towers must be assembled at the tower site.54 The
assembly begins by having a crane place the bottom section of the tower
on the bolts that are protruding from the concrete foundation.55 The
bottom section is then secured to the concrete foundation by a lock
washer and nut.56  After the first section has been secured, the crane
continues to lift the remaining sections into place, and riggers continue to
bolt these sections to the rest of the assembled tower.57 Once the tower
has been assembled, the necessary electrical connections can be made,
and the tower can begin hosting antennas.58
There are also times when telecommunications towers need to be
disassembled. 59 For instance, tower companies sometimes erect towers
in anticipation of cellular telecommunications companies needing to rent
antenna space in particular areas.60  If the cellular telecommunications
slip op. at 1 (Ct. Com. PI. Venango County Oct. 8, 2003).
49. See Brain & Tyson, supra note 5.
50. See Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 534-37;
Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. &
C.4th 140, 146 (Ct. Com. P. Dauphin County 2004), aff'd 869 A.2d 562 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005).
51. Cumberland County Bd. ofAssessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 538.
52. Id. at 539.
53. Id. The court noted that instead of the larger concrete foundation, towers with
legs may have concrete caissons underneath each leg, which are the equivalent of small
concrete foundations. Id.
54. See id. at 540.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68
Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 540-41 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cumberland County 2004). Once all the
sections are bolted together, these towers may range anywhere from under 50 feet in
height (for small monopole towers) to over 1,000 feet in height (for large lattice towers).
Id. at 534.
58. Id. at 540.
59. Id. at 543-44.
60. Id.
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companies never rent the antenna space, the towers may be moved to
more profitable locations.6' Conversely, if cellular telecommunications
companies are renting antenna space on a tower, but the tower is no
longer of sufficient height to accommodate the companies' needs, then
the old tower may be replaced by a taller tower.62 Finally, towers may be
relocated in accordance with population shifts so that the towers, and,
more importantly, the attached antennas, can better serve denser
population areas.63
Disassembling telecommunications towers, in essence, requires a
reversing of the process for assembling them.64 Before disassembly of
the tower begins, all antennas and cables must be removed.65 Riggers
then ascend the tower and begin unfastening the tower's various sections,
which are lowered to the ground by a crane.66 This process continues
until the bottom section of the tower is unbolted from the concrete
foundation.67
Generally, unless the landowner demands their removal, the
equipment shelter, concrete foundation, and fence surrounding the tower
facility are left at the site.68 Therefore, if a tower company decides to
erect another telecommunications tower at the same location at some
point in the future, or if the company is simply replacing an old tower
with a taller tower, the equipment shelter, concrete foundation, and fence
can be reused.69 Similarly, except for the bolts that hold the tower
sections together, all the other parts of a disassembled tower may be
reused at another tower facility as long as they are not damaged during
disassembly or worn out from prolonged use.7 °
C. Common Pleas Courts' Treatment of Telecommunications Towers
for the Purpose of Real Property Taxation
A number of common pleas courts have ruled on various aspects of
this issue.71 In both Shenandoah Mobile Company v. Cumberland
61. Id.
62. Id. at 543. The procedure of replacing a tower that is no longer of sufficient
height with a taller tower is known in the industry as a "drop and swap." Id.
63. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68
Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 543 (Ct. Com. P1. Cumberland County 2004).
64. See id. at 540-41.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 541.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 542.
69. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68
Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 542 (Ct. Com. PI. Cumberland County 2004).
70. Id. at 543.
71. See id. at 548; Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment
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County Board of Assessment Appeals and Shenandoah Mobile Company
v. Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals, the courts held that
telecommunications towers are fixtures of tower facilities, and therefore,
realty.72 Furthermore both courts held that these towers, as fixtures of
tower facilities, are subject to real property taxation.73 However, the two
courts did not agree as to why the towers should be classified as
fixtures.74
In Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals, the court held
that telecommunications towers fall under the second Clayton category.75
The court reasoned that although towers can be removed from their
concrete foundations without causing material injury to either the towers
or the foundations, the foundations themselves cannot be removed from
the ground without materially injuring the surrounding real estate.76
Therefore, the court held that towers should be considered fixtures of
tower facilities, thus subjecting towers to real property taxation.7
In contrast, the court in Cumberland County Board of Assessment
Appeals held that telecommunications towers fall under the third Clayton
category.78 The court reasoned that towers can be removed from their
foundations without causing material injury to either the towers or the
foundations. 79 However, the court also reasoned that towers are essential
to the use of tower facilities, and that tower companies intend for towers
to become permanent fixtures of tower facilities. 80 Therefore, although
for different reasons than the court in Dauphin County Board of
Assessment Appeals, the court also held that towers are fixtures, thus
Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th 140, 148 (Ct. Com. P1. Dauphin County 2004), aff'd 869 A.2d
562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, Civ. No. 02-620, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Com. PI. Venango County Oct. 8, 2003).
72. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 148; Dauphin
County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 147-48.
73. See cases cited supra note 72.
74. Compare Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 148,
with Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 147-48.
75. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 147.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 147-48.
78. See Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 548.
While the court did not specifically state that telecommunications towers fell into the
third Clayton category, the court did apply the test used by the court in In re Sheetz, Inc.,
to determine whether a chattel was intended by the parties to become a fixture of real
property. Id. Because this test is used by the courts to determine whether a chattel has
become a fixture of real property under the third Clayton category, it is fair to assume the
court in this case believed the telecommunications towers fell into the third Clayton
category. See In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Gore
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
79. Cumberland County Bd. ofAssessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 548.
80. Id.
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subjecting them to real property taxation.8"
In addition to addressing the issue of whether telecommunications
towers are fixtures, and thus subject to real property taxation,
Pennsylvania common pleas courts have also addressed the issue of
whether telecommunications towers are excluded from real property
taxation under section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception.
82
In SBA Towers v. Venango County Board of Assessment Appeals, the
court held that towers are not excluded from real property taxation under
section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception.83 The court held
that telecommunications towers, and tower facilities in general, are not
used to produce a tangible product; instead, they are simply used for
transferring and receiving signals to and from cellular devices.
84
Because towers and tower facilities are not used in producing a tangible
product, the court held that towers could not be excluded from real
property taxation under the industrial establishment exception of section
5020-201.85
III. Analysis
A. The Classifcation of Telecommunications Towers as Fixtures for
the Purpose of Real Property Taxation
Telecommunications towers are not specifically listed as types of
realty that are subject to real property taxation under section 5020-201 of
the Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated. 86  In fact, telecommunications
towers are actually chattels, or personalty. 87 Chattels are generally not
subject to real property taxation under section 5020-201 unless they are
classified as fixtures, thus allowing them to fall under section 5020-201's
catch-all provision. 88 Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether
telecommunications towers can be classified as fixtures, thus subjecting
them to real property taxation under section 5020-201.
81. Compare id., with Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at
147-48.
82. See SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-
620, slip op. at 4-5 (Ct. Com. P1. Venango County Oct. 8, 2003).
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 4-5.
86. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201 (West Supp. 2004).
87. See Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
68 D. & C.4th 529, 540-42 (Ct. Com. P1. Cumberland County 2004) (describing towers
as moveable pieces of property); 6 KANE, supra note 15, § 3:6.
88. See sources cited supra note 19.
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1. Telecommunications Towers Fall Under the Clayton Test's
Third Category of Chattels Used in Conjunction with Real Property
Under the Clayton test, chattels used in conjunction with real
property are divided into three categories. 89  However, only those
chattels which fall into the second or third Clayton categories can be
classified as fixtures. 90 In order to determine in which Clayton category
telecommunications towers properly belong, it will be helpful to consider
not only the characteristics of these towers, but also the characteristics of
other chattels which courts have previously placed into each category. 91
The first Clayton category encompasses chattels that are not
attached to the property they are used in conjunction with; in other
words, chattels that are "manifestly furniture[.],,92 Courts have placed
chattels such as moveable bleachers located at a concert facility and
picnic tables sitting inside an open pavilion in this category.93 For both
of these specific chattels, the courts supported their classifications by
reasoning that the moveable bleachers and the picnic tables were not
attached to the real property with which they were being used.9 4 Because
physical attachment to real property is a prerequisite for placing a chattel
in either the second or third Clayton category, the only Clayton category
left for these chattels was the first.
95
Unlike the moveable bleachers and picnic tables,
telecommunications towers are physically attached to the tower facilities
that they are used in conjunction with.96 In fact, towers are securely
89. Clayton v. Lienhard, 167 A. 321, 322 (Pa. 1933).
90. See id.
91. In affirming the common pleas court's decision, the Commonwealth Court
placed telecommunications towers in the third Clayton category without providing any
rationale for this categorization, even though the common pleas court had held that
telecommunications towers belong in the second Clayton category. See Shenandoah
Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869 A.2d 562, 566-67 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005); Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 140, 147 (Ct. Com. Pl. Dauphin County 2004), aff'd 869
A.2d 562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
92. Clayton, 167 A. at 322.
93. See Blocker v. City of Philadelphia, 763 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa. 2000) (holding that
moveable bleachers used at a concert facility were not fixtures); Kniaz v. Benton
Borough, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 36, 41-42 (Ct. Com. Pl. Columbia County 1986) (holding that
a picnic table that was unattached to the pavilion in which it was sitting was not a
fixture), aff'd, 535 A.2d 308 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
94. Blocker, 763 A.2d at 375; Kniaz, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 41-42.
95. See Clayton, 167 A. at 322; Blocker, 763 A.2d at 375; Kniaz, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d
at 40.
96. Compare Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 548 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cumberland County 2004), with
Blocker, 763 A.2d at 375, and Kniaz, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 40-41.
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attached to tower facilities and, more specifically, to the facilities'
concrete foundations, by a number of bolts and nuts.97 This physical
attachment to the tower facilities precludes the towers from belonging to
the first Clayton category. 98 Therefore, telecommunications towers must
fall under either the second or third Clayton category. 99
The second Clayton category encompasses chattels that are not only
attached to the property they are used in conjunction with, but are also
unable to be removed from the property without materially injuring
either the chattel or the property. 00 The premier example of a chattel
which belongs in the second Clayton category is the sprinkler system
discussed in Clayton.'0 ' The sprinkler system was built into a parking
garage as the parking garage was being constructed.' °2 The piping for
the sprinkler system spanned three floors, going both underground and
through the walls of the garage.10 3 Any attempt to remove the sprinkler
system from the garage would have resulted in serious damage to both
the garage and the sprinkler system. 104 Thus, the court concluded that the
sprinkler system was a fixture of the garage.
0 5
One Pennsylvania common pleas court has held that
telecommunications towers also belong in the second Clayton
category. 0 6 The court in Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals
reasoned that "while the [tower] itself may be removable without injury,
the massive concrete base ... cannot be removed without injury to the
real estate."'' 0 7 However, whether or not damage would result to the
surrounding property from the removal of the concrete foundation is
irrelevant. 1 8 Instead, when determining whether a tower falls within the
second Clayton category, the relevant inquiry is whether the tower could
be removed without injury to either the tower or the concrete
foundation. 0 9
Unlike the sprinkler system in Clayton, telecommunications towers
can be removed from tower facilities without materially damaging either
97. Cumberland County Bd. ofAssessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 540.






104. Clayton v. Lienhard, 167 A. 321, 322 (Pa. 1933).
105. See id. at 322-23.
106. See Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68
Pa. D. & C.4th 140, 147 (Ct. Com P1. Dauphin County 2004), affd 869 A.2d 562 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005).
107. Id.
108. See Clayton, 167 A. at 322.
109. See id.
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the towers or the facilities. 10 This is evident from the tower industry's
practice of disassembling and relocating towers which are no longer
needed in certain areas, as well as its practice of replacing towers of
insufficient height with taller towers."' The disassembled towers can be
reassembled at another tower facility, and the old tower facility can host
another tower if a tower is later needed at that location." 12 The only parts
of either the towers or the tower facilities that need replaced during these
processes are the bolts which hold the tower sections together." 13 In fact,
the court in Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals even noted
that towers could be removed from the tower facilities without causing
material damage to either the towers or tower facilities." 14
Because towers can be removed from tower facilities without
materially damaging the towers or the facilities, towers do not fall under
the second Clayton category. 1 5  Therefore, as the court held in
Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals, telecommunications
towers fall under the third Clayton category-chattels that are physically
attached to real property, but can be removed from the real property
without materially damaging the chattel or the real property." 
6
2. Telecommunications Towers are Fixtures According to the
Gore/Sheetz Factors
Because telecommunications towers fall under the third Clayton
category of chattels," 7 the Gore/Sheetz factors must be applied in order
to determine whether telecommunications towers can be classified as
fixtures. 118 In Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals, the
court, in a rather brief analysis, summarily applied the Gore/Sheetz
factors and concluded that telecommunications towers are fixtures of real
property. 19 While the court correctly held that telecommunications
110. Compare id. with Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 540-42 (Ct. Com. Pl. Cumberland County
2004).
111. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 543-44.
112. Id. at 542-44.
113. Id. at543.
114. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa.
D. & C.4th 140, 147 (Ct. Com. Pl. Dauphin County 2004), affd 869 A.2d 562 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005).
115. See Clayton, 167 A. at 322; Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68
Pa. D. & C.4th 542-43.
116. See Clayton, 167 A. at 322; supra notes 78, 110-14 and accompanying text.
117. See supra Part III.A.1.
118. See In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Gore v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
119. See Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 D. & C.4th at 548. The
court's application of the Gore/Sheetz factors to telecommunications towers consisted of
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towers are fixtures, a more in-depth application of the Gore/Sheetz
factors to telecommunications towers, as was conducted by the
Commonwealth Court in Shenandoah Mobile Company v. Dauphin
County Board of Assessment Appeals, indicates that telecommunications
towers are indeed fixtures of tower facilities.120
The first Gore/Sheetz factor addresses the manner in which the
chattel in question is attached to the real property. 2 1  As the
Commonwealth Court reasoned, telecommunications towers, much like
the canopies in In re Sheetz, are attached to tower facilities by placing the
towers over large bolts, which are cemented into concrete foundations,
and then securing the towers with lock washers and nuts.12 2 Thus, towers
would seem to have "the requisite degree of 'attachment"' necessary to
deem them fixtures of tower facilities. 2 3  Furthermore, the fact that
towers can be removed from the tower facilities does not preclude them
from being characterized as being securely attached to the tower
facilities, as securing a chattel to real property by bolts is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that the chattel be permanently attached to the
real property. 124
The second Gore/Sheetz factor takes into consideration whether the
chattel is essential to the use of the real property. 125 In considering this
factor, the Commonwealth Court found that the concrete pads at tower
facilities are absolutely useless if towers are not attached to them because
"the concrete pad[s are] installed solely to support the [t]ower. ,, 6
Thus, telecommunications towers are essential to the use of tower
facilities. 127
the following:
First, the towers are firmly affixed to the ground.... Second, the towers are
essential to the use of the rest of the facility....
Third, and perhaps most important, the intent of the parties that the towers be
features of the real estate ... is manifest in the extended terms of the leases and
the practice of the industry ....
Id.
120. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
121. InreSheetz, Inc.,657A.2dat 1013; Gore, 537A.2dat915.
122. See Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869
A.2d 562, 567-68 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); see also Cumberland County Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 540.
123. See Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869 A.2d at 568. Other factors
that influenced the Commonwealth Court's finding that telecommunications towers are
attached to tower facilities included the effort required to remove a tower and the
infrequency in which towers are removed. Id.
124. Id.
125. InreSheetz, Inc., 657A.2dat 1014; Gore, 537A.2dat915.
126. Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869
A.2d at 568-69.
127. Id. at 569.
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Finally, the third, and most weighty, Gore/Sheetz factor examines
whether a party intended the chattel in question to become a permanent
fixture when the party attached the chattel to the real property. 128 The
Commonwealth Court noted that most leases for the land on which tower
facilities are built are structured to last well over twenty years.
129
Additionally, the Commonwealth Court found that towers would only be
removed from tower facilities "when business warrants it. ' 130 Thus, the
Commonwealth Court found that tower companies' conduct
demonstrated their intent to have telecommunications towers become
permanent fixtures of tower facilities.
131
Because telecommunications towers are essential to the use of tower
facilities, permanently attached to tower facilities, and most importantly,
intended by tower companies to become fixtures of tower facilities,
towers are indeed fixtures of tower facilities according to the
Gore/Sheetz factors.132 Furthermore, because telecommunications towers
can be classified as fixtures of tower facilities, they are subject to real
property taxation under section 5020-201.
B. The Effect of Section 5020-201 's Industrial Establishment Exception
on the Assessment of Real Property Taxes on Telecommunications
Towers
Because telecommunications towers are fixtures of tower facilities,
tower companies can be assessed real property taxes on the towers under
section 5020-201's catch-all provision as long as the towers do not fall
under section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception. 134  The
court in Venango County Board of Assessment Appeals held that
128. InreSheetz, Inc., 657A.2dat 1014; Gore, 537A.2dat9l5.
129. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869 A.2d at 569. For example,
most leases entered into by the tower companies provide for an original five-year lease of
the land, with automatic renewals for four or five more five-year periods. See
Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. &
C.4th 529, 534-37 (Ct. Com. P1. Cumberland County 2004).
130. Dauphin County Bd. ofAssessment Appeals, 869 A.2d at 569.
131. Id.
132. See id. supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
133. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201 (West Supp. 2004); Dauphin County Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 869 A.2d at 569; In re Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d at 1014; 27 BRIGHT,
supra note 16, § 15:7. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that telecommunications
towers would not be subject to real property taxation if they fell under section 5020-201 's
industrial establishment exception. See infra Part III.B.
134. See supra Part III.A. Section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception
provides that "[m]achinery, tools, appliances and other equipment contained in any mill,
mine, manufactory or industrial establishment shall not be considered or included as a
part of the real estate in determining the value of such mill, mine, manufactory or
industrial establishment." 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5050-201.
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telecommunications towers do not fall under section 5020-201's
industrial establishment exception. 35  The court reasoned that an
ordinary man would not think of a telecommunications tower as an
industrial establishment, and furthermore, that telecommunications
towers are not used in the production of any type of product.'
136
In all likelihood, the court reached the correct result in holding that
telecommunications towers do not fall under section 5020-201's
industrial establishment exception; however, the court seemed confused
in its analysis of the problem.' 37 The court supported its holding by first
citing the failure of the towers to be used in the manufacture of some
product, 38 and then citing the fact that tower facilities could not be
viewed as industrial establishments under the ordinary man test.'
39
However, the correct analysis would have been to determine first
whether tower facilities are industrial establishments under the ordinary
man test, and if they are, then to determine whether the towers are used
directly in and are integral parts of the manufacturing process.
40
Therefore, it is important to reexamine the court's holding, using the
proper analysis, to determine what effect, if any, section 5020-201's
industrial establishment exception will have on the taxation of
telecommunications towers.
The first step in analyzing whether section 5020-201's industrial
establishment exception applies to telecommunications towers is to
determine whether the ordinary man would see tower facilities as
industrial establishments. 4 1 Traditionally, the definition of industrial
establishments has included facilities such as steel mills and power
plants, which produce traditional industrial products. 42 However, the
definition of industrial establishments has been expanded to include
facilities which produce both tangible and intangible non-industrial
products, such as newspapers and television programming. 143 Thus, the
135. SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-620,
slip op. at 4-5 (Ct. Com. P1. Venango County Oct. 8, 2003).
136. Id.
137. See id.; infra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
138. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-620 at 4.
139. Id. at 5.
140. See In re Borough of Aliquippa, 175 A.2d 856, 861 (Pa. 1961); City of
Pittsburgh v. WICC-TV Corp., 321 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
141. City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388.
142. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Assessment & Revision of Taxes,
223 A.2d 92, 95 (Pa. 1966) (defining steel mills as industrial establishments); In re W.
Penn Power Co., 588 A.2d 997, 999-1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (defining power plants
as industrial establishments).
143. Messenger Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals, & Review, 132
A.2d 768, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957) (holding that a newspaper printing facility is an
industrial establishment); City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388 (holding that a television
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only restriction on defining a facility as an industrial establishment is
whether an ordinary man would see the facility as an industrial
establishment. 144
In Messenger Publishing Company v. Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals, & Review, the court stated that "the ordinary man
would think of a newspaper as an industrial plant, especially if one were
to tell him that a laundry or a carpet cleaning company are such for the
purpose here being considered.' ' 145 Then in City of Pittsburgh v. WIIC-
TV Corporation, the court stated that "the same ordinary man would
think of a TV station as an industrial establishment, especially if one
were to tell him that a newspaper plant is such for the purpose here being
considered."' 146  Thus, the logical inquiry in the case of
telecommunications towers would seem to be whether an ordinary man
would consider a tower facility an industrial establishment, especially
knowing that newspaper printing facilities and television stations are
considered industrial establishments.
47
The Venango County Board of Assessment Appeals court answered
this question in the negative, stating that an ordinary man would not
think of a tower facility as an industrial establishment, unlike a
newspaper printing facility or television station. 148 In support of this
assertion, the court noted that there are no workers at tower facilities.
49
Additionally, the court noted that tower facilities are not used in the
creation of any type of product.' 50  Instead, the court viewed tower
facilities as the mere "middlemen" of cellular communications: the tower
facilities simply receive and transmit signals between cellular devices.
15
Therefore, under the ordinary man standard, tower facilities would not be
considered industrial establishments, and they would not fit under section
5020-201's industrial establishment exception.
52
The court's application of the ordinary man standard is the most
logical application of this standard to tower facilities. 53 In the most
general terms, tower facilities simply operate to receive incoming signals
from "Device A," and then transmit outgoing signals to "Device B,"
station is an industrial establishment).
144. See City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388; supra notes 142-43 and accompanying
text.
145. Messenger Publ'g Co., 132 A.2d at 769 (quoting the trial court).
146. City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388.
147. See Messenger Publ'g Co., 132 A.2d at 769; City of Pittsburgh, 321 A.2d at 388.
148. SBA Towers v. Venango County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, Civ. No. 02-620,




152. Id. at 5.
153. See id. at 4-5; infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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allowing the two devices, and the people using them, to communicate
with each other.1 54  Thus, tower facilities are not responsible for the
creation of any type of product, whether tangible, such as newspapers, or
intangible, such as television programming. 155 Furthermore, there are no
workers operating these tower facilities. 156 Therefore, it is logical to
conclude that an ordinary man would not think of a tower facility as an
industrial establishment, precluding the towers contained in, or attached
to, these facilities from being exempt from real property taxation under
section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception.
57
Of course, courts are not bound by the confines of logic. It is
always possible that a court could be persuaded that tower facilities are
indeed industrial establishments under the ordinary man standard.
However, even if a court would hold that tower facilities are industrial
establishments, telecommunications towers would not fall under section
5020-201's industrial establishment exception unless the towers were
shown to be "integral parts of the manufacturing process" that are used
directly in and solely for the production of the products being produced
by the tower facility. 58 Furthermore, this standard is a strict standard in
which courts are not likely to grant much leeway. 59 Therefore, courts
should find that telecommunications towers do not fall under section
5020-201's industrial establishment exception, and they are therefore
subject to real property taxation under section 5020-20.16
C. A Better Approach?: New York's Treatment of Telecommunications
Equipment for the Purpose of Real Property Taxation
Like Pennsylvania, New York has considered the question of
whether telecommunications equipment, including towers, is subject to
154. See Brain & Tyson, supra note 5.
155. Compare id. with Messenger Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals, &
Review, 132 A.2d 768, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957), and City of Pittsburgh v. WIC-TV
Corp., 321 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
156. See Brain & Tyson, supra note 5.
157. See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
158. In re Borough of Aliquippa, 175 A.2d 856, 861 (Pa. 1961). Of course, the
application of these requirements presupposes that a court could identify some product
which is being produced by telecommunications towers at tower facilities. See id.
(requiring the fixtures in question to aid "in manufacturing the products" being produced
at the industrial establishment). Speculation as to what this product could be is beyond
the scope of this comment.
159. See, e.g., In re W. Penn Power Co., 588 A.2d 997, 999-1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991) (holding that an electric plant's oil tanks, which were used to store oil before the
oil was pumped from the tanks to the boilers, were not fixtures which qualified for
section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception because the oil tanks were not an
integral and direct part of the electricity manufacturing process).
160. See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
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real property taxation.1 61  In Nextel of New York, Incorporated v.
Assessor for Spring Valley, a court held that all telecommunications
equipment, including antennas, cables, and equipment sheds, are subject
to real property taxation. 62  While this decision concerning
telecommunications equipment is important, what is more important is
the reasoning behind the court's decision. Specifically, this decision was
not based upon the application of a common law fixtures test, 163 but
rather a provision of New York law that specifically addressed the issue
of whether telecommunications equipment is subject to real property
taxation."'
New York, in section 102(12)(i) of the Real Property Tax Law,
defines real property to include "all lines, wires, poles, supports and
inclosures for electrical conductors upon, above and underground used in
connection with the transmission or switching of electromagnetic voice,
video and data signals between different entities separated by air, street
or other public domain[.]' 165 The court in Nextel of New York, after
considering the legislative history of section 102(12)(i), reasoned that
this definition was written with the specific intention of including
telecommunications equipment in the definition of real property.
66
Therefore, the court held that the telecommunications equipment at issue,
although technically labeled as antennas, cables, and an equipment shed,
were really poles (the antennas), lines (the cables), and inclosures (the
shed) within the meaning of section 102(12)(i).167  The
telecommunications equipment thus fell under section 102(12)(i)'s
definition of real property, subjecting the equipment to real property
taxation. 168
It logically follows from this holding that telecommunications
towers, had they been considered, also would have qualified as either
poles or supports under section 102(12)(i), making them real property
subject to real property taxation. 169 Thus, the benefit of a provision such
161. See, e.g., Nextel of New York, Inc. v. Assessor for Spring Valley, 771 N.Y.S.2d
853 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
162. Id. at 859-60. The court did not specifically address telecommunications towers
in this opinion because the antennas were mounted on a water tower; however, the
court's reasoning applies just as forcefully to towers as it does all other
telecommunications equipment. See id. at 854, 859-60.
163. While the court applied a common law fixtures test at the end of its opinion, it
made clear that the primary basis for its holding was the statutory language, which
specifically defines telecommunications equipment as real property. See id. at 859-61.
164. See id.
165. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW § 102(12)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2005).
166. See Nextel of New York, Inc., 771 N.Y.S.2d at 857-60.
167. Id. at 859-60.
168. Id.
169. See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW § 102(12)(i); Nextel of New York, Inc., 771
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as section 102(12)(i) in statutes concerning real property taxation is
apparent. Instead of applying a complicated fixtures analysis to
determine whether telecommunications towers are real property, one
needs only to look at the language of the applicable tax statute to
determine that all telecommunications equipment, including towers, is
defined as real property subject to real property taxation.
70
IV. Conclusion
The Commonwealth Court and common pleas courts in Dauphin
County Board of Assessment Appeals and Cumberland County Board of
Assessment Appeals, respectively, were correct when they ruled that
telecommunications towers are subject to real property taxation under
section 5020-201 of the Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated.1 7 1 Towers fall
under the third Clayton category of chattels-they are attached to the
tower facilities, but can be removed without causing material injury to
either the towers or tower facilities.172 Additionally, application of the
Gore/Sheetz factors to telecommunications towers reveals that towers are
intended to become permanent fixtures of tower facilities. 73 Therefore,
towers, as fixtures, fall under section 5020-201's catch-all provision,
providing that "all other real estate not exempt by law from taxation" are
subject to real property taxation. 74  Furthermore, towers do not fall
under section 5020-201's industrial establishment exception. 175 Thus,
telecommunications towers are taxable as real property under
Pennsylvania law. 1
76
However, instead relying on a complicated common law fixtures
analysis to support the taxation of telecommunications towers as real
property, Pennsylvania's General Assembly should take a cue from New
York and revise section 5020-201 to specifically address this issue.1 77 If
the General Assembly agrees with the courts and would prefer to
continue taxing telecommunications towers, it could simply revise
N.Y.S.2d at 859-60.
170. See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW § 102(12)(i); Nextel of New York, Inc., 771
N.Y.S.2d at 859-61. For an example of a complicated common law fixtures analysis, see
supra Part III.A.
171. See Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 869
A.2d 562, 569 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County
Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 529, 548 (Ct. Com. PI. Cumberland
County 2004); supra Part III.A.
172. See supra Part III.A. 1.
173. See supra Part III.A.2.
174. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020-201 (West Supp. 2004); see supra Part III.A.
175. See supra Part III.B.
176. See supra Part 1ILA-B.
177. See supra Part III.C.
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section 5020-201 to include the phrase "telecommunications towers"
before the catch-all provision. Conversely, if the General Assembly
disagrees with the courts and would prefer to protect towers, and tower
companies, from real property taxation, it could include a statement after
the industrial establishment exception stating, "No telecommunications
towers shall be considered real property subject to taxation." Either way,
it is time for the General Assembly to settle the debate over whether
telecommunications towers are subject to real property taxation.

